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CASE NOTE 
 
“I’LL TAKE FORM OVER SUBSTANCE FOR $800, TREBEK”: 
WHY BLUEFORD WAS TOO RIGID AND HOW STATES  
CAN PROPERLY PROVIDE DOUBLE JEOPARDY PROTECTION 
WARREN M. KLINGER† 
INTRODUCTION 
In August 2009, Arkansas tried Alex Blueford for the murder of a one-
year-old child.1 Blueford was charged with capital murder, which included 
three lesser offenses: first-degree murder, manslaughter, and negligent 
homicide.2 After deliberation, a jury of Blueford’s peers reported to the trial 
judge that it unanimously opposed the charges of capital and first-degree 
murder,3 yet despite the protection offered by the Double Jeopardy Clause 
of the Fifth Amendment,4 Arkansas attempted to retry Blueford on those 
charges.5 Notwithstanding persuasive arguments from Blueford’s counsel, the 
Supreme Court held that Blueford was never acquitted of either charge and 
was therefore not protected from retrial under the Double Jeopardy Clause.6 
 
† Senior Editor, University of Pennsylvania Law Review, Volume 162. J.D. Candidate, 2014, 
University of Pennsylvania Law School; B.A., University of California, Berkeley. I would like to 
thank Professor David Rudovsky for his indispensable assistance and guidance, and Bianca Nunes 
and Jessica Rice for their diligence with this piece. 
1 Blueford v. Arkansas, 132 S. Ct. 2044, 2048 (2012). 
2 Id. 
3 Id. The jury was deadlocked on the charge of manslaughter and did not vote on negligent 
homicide. Id. 
4 See U.S. CONST. amend. V (“No person shall . . . be subject for the same offence to be 
twice put in jeopardy of life or limb . . . .”). 
5 Blueford, 132 S. Ct. at 2049. 
6 Id. at 2053. 
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Blueford embodies two distinct yet related propositions. First, the Court 
held that the jury foreperson’s report that the jury was unanimous in 
opposing capital and first-degree murder charges did not constitute an 
acquittal as to those charges.7 Second, and more crucially, the Court deter-
mined that the trial judge was not required to allow the jury to give effect to 
that unanimous vote—either by issuing partial verdict forms or polling the 
jury—before finding that “‘circumstances manifest[ed] a necessity’ to 
declare a mistrial.”8 In “cases in which the mistrial was justified by ‘manifest 
necessity,’” the Double Jeopardy Clause does not bar retrial.9 Accordingly, the 
Court concluded that the Double Jeopardy Clause did not prevent the state 
from retrying Alex Blueford, or a similarly situated defendant, for murder.  
Critics asserted that the Supreme Court’s decision to give Arkansas a 
“second shot” at convicting Blueford of murder10 directly contravened the 
core principles of the Fifth Amendment’s Double Jeopardy Clause: that the 
state should not be allowed to repeatedly attempt to convict individuals for 
the same alleged offense, and that the finality of judgments is of paramount 
importance to the smooth functioning of the judicial system.11 So great was 
the Framers’ fear of this oppressive practice12 that they expressly protected 
against it in the Bill of Rights. 
Did the Court actually give states the “proverbial second bite at the ap-
ple”13 in violation of the Double Jeopardy Clause or is there more to this 
case? The discrete issue in Blueford is not so much about interpreting the 
Double Jeopardy Clause as it is about convoluted jury forms and instruc-
tions.14 Part I of this Note provides an overview of double jeopardy juris-
prudence. Part II discusses the Blueford decision and analyzes its strengths 
and weaknesses, including the Court’s rigid application of past precedent 
without consideration for the policy behind the Clause or the practical 
implications of its decision. Part III offers solutions to the problem of the 
acquittal-first instructions presented in Blueford, including eliminating 
 
7 Id. at 2050.  
8 Id. at 2052-53 (quoting Wade v. Hunter, 336 U.S. 684, 690 (1949)). 
9 Oregon v. Kennedy, 456 U.S. 667, 683 (1982) (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment) 
(quoting Arizona v. Washington, 434 U.S. 497, 505 (1978)); see also infra Section I.A. 
10 See, e.g., Mike Sacks, Supreme Court Allows Arkansas Second Shot at Murder Trial in Double 
Jeopardy Dispute, HUFFINGTON POST, May ��, ����, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/����/��/��/ 
supreme-court-double-jeopardy-arkansas-murder-alex-blueford_n_1542396.html. 
11 See Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184, 187 (1957). 
12 See Blueford, 132 S. Ct. at 2057 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting). 
13 Id. at 2053 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). 
14 See id. at 2058 (discussing the problems that develop in acquittal-first jurisdictions and 
proposing that trial judges in these jurisdictions honor a defendant’s request for a partial verdict 
before declaring a mistrial on the ground of jury deadlock). 
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“convict-on-any-or-acquit-on-all” jury forms and requiring judges to 
provide partial verdict forms or to poll a jury before declaring a mistrial due 
to a hung jury.  
I. LEGAL BACKGROUND 
A. The Double Jeopardy Clause:  
What Does It Protect and When Is It Triggered?  
The Double Jeopardy Clause, which protects the accused against both 
multiple trials and multiple punishments for the same crime, 15 is fundamen-
tal to the American justice system: 
The underlying idea, one that is deeply ingrained in at least the Anglo-
American system of jurisprudence, is that the State with all its resources 
and power should not be allowed to make repeated attempts to convict an 
individual for an alleged offense, thereby subjecting him to embarrassment, 
expense and ordeal and compelling him to live in a continuing state of anxi-
ety and insecurity . . . .16  
Over the past two hundred years, the Court has strictly construed the 
Double Jeopardy Clause so that its protections apply only when certain 
conditions are satisfied. Double Jeopardy acts as a bar to a second (or third 
or fourth) trial only when jeopardy both attached and terminated during the 
earlier proceeding.17 Attachment occurs when the jury is empaneled and 
sworn18 or when a plea is accepted. However, jeopardy only terminates, 
thereby barring retrial, “[i]f the defendant is acquitted by the jury, or if he 
is convicted”19 or criminally punished for the offense.20  
The most controversial facet of double jeopardy jurisprudence, and the 
issue in Blueford, stems from the impact of a mistrial on double jeopardy. 
The general rule is that when a trial judge declares a mistrial, double 
 
15 Witte v. United States, 515 U.S. 389, 395-96 (1995) (citations omitted); see also Price v. 
Georgia, 398 U.S. 323, 326 (1970) (“The ‘twice put in jeopardy’ language of the Constitution thus 
relates to a potential, i.e., the risk that an accused for a second time will be convicted of the ‘same 
offense’ for which he was initially tried.”). 
16 Green, 355 U.S. at 187; see also United States v. Martin Linen Supply Co., 430 U.S. 564, 
569 (1977). 
17 See Ex parte Lange, 85 U.S. (18 Wall.) 163, 173-74 (1873). 
18 Crist v. Bretz, 437 U.S. 28, 38 (1978). 
19 Oregon v. Kennedy, 456 U.S. 667, 682 (1982) (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment). 
20 See, e.g., Price, 398 U.S. at 326-�� (holding that a conviction of a lesser included offense 
barred a second trial for the greater offense). 
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jeopardy bars retrial, with an exception for “cases in which the mistrial was 
justified by ‘manifest necessity.’”21  This exception, however, has largely 
swallowed the rule. Demonstrating manifest necessity has become such a 
low burden that, except in rare instances, mistrials do not bar retrial.  
The doctrine of manifest necessity first developed in 1824 in the seminal 
case, United States v. Perez.22 In Perez, the trial judge discharged the jury and 
declared a mistrial because the jury was unable to agree on a verdict.23 The 
Court held that because the defendant had been neither convicted nor 
acquitted, there was “manifest necessity” to declare a mistrial, and jeopardy 
thus did not bar retrial.24 Manifest necessity is a fluid concept, but a hung 
jury—as in Blueford—has repeatedly been found to qualify, thereby circum-
venting double jeopardy and permitting retrial.25  
Blueford is therefore not a straightforward case about the proper inter-
pretation of the Double Jeopardy Clause, but rather a complicated inquiry 
into what constitutes manifest necessity to declare a mistrial.  
B. Acquittal-First Instructions 
Alex Blueford’s appeal would not have reached the Arkansas Supreme 
Court—let alone the United States Supreme Court—had Arkansas not been 
an “acquittal-first” jurisdiction. As a matter of Arkansas law, before a jury 
may consider a lesser included offense, it must “first determine that the 
proof is insufficient to convict on the greater offense.”26 In other words, 
unless a jury votes unanimously to acquit on the greater charge, it cannot 
deliberate over a lesser charge.27  
Acquittal-first instructions developed after, and primarily in response to, 
the advent of the lesser included offense instruction, which provides that, 
“[a] jury [is] permitted to find [a] defendant guilty of any lesser offense 
 
21 Kennedy, 456 U.S. at 683 (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment) (quoting Arizona v. 
Washington, 434 U.S. 497, 505 (1978)). 
22 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 579 (1824). 
23 Id. at 579. 
24 Id. at 580. 
25 See, e.g., Renico v. Lett, 130 S. Ct. 1855, 1862-63 (2010) (“[W]hen a judge discharges a jury 
on the grounds that the jury cannot reach a verdict, the Double Jeopardy Clause does not bar a 
new trial for the defendant before a new jury.” (citing Perez, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) at 579-80)). 
26 Blueford v. Arkansas, 132 S. Ct. 2044, 2054 (2012) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting). 
27 Id. (citing Hughes v. State, 66 S.W.3d 645, 651 (Ark. 2002)). But see Brief of Amici Curiae 
State of Michigan, 22 Other States & 1 Territory in Support of the State of Arkansas at 17, 
Blueford, 132 S. Ct. 2044 (No. 10-1320), 2012 WL 105561 (arguing that Arkansas “is not an ‘acquittal 
first’ jurisdiction” because the jury instructions do not explicitly require unanimity or acquittal 
before the jury moves on to lesser offenses). 
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necessarily included in the offense charged.”28 For example, in a jurisdiction 
allowing for lesser included offenses, if a defendant is charged with murder, 
the jury may also find the defendant guilty of manslaughter. Although the 
lesser included offense rule “originally developed as an aid to the prosecu-
tion in cases in which the proof failed to establish some element of the 
crime charged,”29 courts began viewing the rule as beneficial to defendants 
because it “ensures that the jury will accord the defendant the full benefit of 
the reasonable-doubt standard.”30 In response to the lesser included offense 
rule, states developed acquittal-first jury instructions to ensure that the 
greatest offense would always be deliberated on and to prevent juries from 
voting to convict on a lesser charge merely to avoid conflict.31  
There are three traditional approaches to jury instructions when lesser 
included offenses are submitted to the jury: (1) the acquittal-first instruction 
or “step approach,” which requires a unanimous jury acquittal of the greater 
charge before the jury may proceed to consider a lesser charge; (2) the 
“unable to agree” charge, which directs the jury to consider a lesser charge 
only if it is unable to agree on the greater charge; and (3) the “unstructured” 
approach, which does not require any particular sequence of deliberation.32  
Critics argue that acquittal-first instructions coerce jurors, hinder judi-
cial efficiency by producing more hung juries, and invade the jury’s prov-
ince as ultimate fact-finder. 33  Proponents of acquittal-first instructions 
assert that they improve the functioning of the constitutionally mandated 
jury system because they (1) ensure that a jury thoroughly deliberates on 
each offense, (2) produce a conclusive decision on each offense considered, 
and (3) guard against compromise verdicts.34 Prior to Blueford, the Court 
 
28 Beck v. Alabama, 447 U.S. 625, 633 (1980). 
29 Id. 
30 Id. at 634 (citing Keeble v. United States, 412 U.S. 205, 212-13 (1973)); see also David F. 
Abele, Comment, Jury Deliberations and the Lesser Included Offense Rule: Getting the Courts Back in 
Step, 23 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 375, 377 (1990) (“A jury can more accurately determine the degree of 
a defendant's guilt, if any, with this additional option.”). 
31 See, e.g., People v. Hickey, 303 N.W.2d 19, 21 (Mich. Ct. App. 1981) (noting that “jury 
votes on included offenses may be the result of a temporary compromise in an effort to reach 
unanimity”). 
32 People v. Helliger, 691 N.Y.S.2d 858, 861 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1998) (citing Abele, supra note 
30, at 380-82). 
33 See, e.g., Abele, supra note 30, at 382-90. 
34 See id. at 397-98. In a compromise verdict, the jury avoids fully discussing the greater 
offense by convicting on a lesser included offense on which all jurors can agree. See id. at 390 n.136 
(listing five categories of compromise verdicts). 
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had looked unfavorably upon this type of instruction,35 yet had failed to 
substantively address the issue of whether acquittal-first jury instructions 
could violate the Double Jeopardy Clause.  
C. Single Verdict Jury Forms 
Also significant in Blueford is that Arkansas used single verdict, convict-
on-any-or-acquit-on-all jury forms. Under the direction of a single verdict 
jury form, a jury has only three options: (1) convict on any charge, (2) 
acquit on all charges, or (3) hang.36 The jury does not have the opportunity 
to acquit on only some of the charges (i.e., to issue a partial verdict). The 
problem presented by single verdict jury forms in an acquittal-first jurisdic-
tion had not been contemplated by the Court prior to Blueford. 
II. THE DECISION: BLUEFORD V. ARKANSAS 
 A. Factual and Procedural Setting 
In 2008, Arkansas charged Alex Blueford with capital murder, first-
degree murder, manslaughter, and negligent homicide.37 Arkansas alleged 
that “Blueford, acting under circumstances manifesting an extreme indiffer-
ence to the value of human life, caused the death of Matthew McFadden, 
Jr., a person fourteen years of age or younger.”38 At the close of the trial, 
the judge instructed the jury on the pertinent definitions of each of the four 
charges.39 Before directing the jury to commence deliberations, the trial judge 
delivered the following instruction under Arkansas’s acquittal-first rule:  
If you have a reasonable doubt of the defendant’s guilt on the charge of 
capital murder, you will consider the charge of murder in the first degree. . . . 
If you have a reasonable doubt of the defendant’s guilt on the charge of 
murder in the first degree, you will then consider the charge of manslaugh-
ter. . . . If you have a reasonable doubt of the defendant’s guilt on the 
 
35 See Smith v. Spisak, 130 S. Ct. 676, 690-91 (2010) (Stevens, J., concurring in part and 
concurring in the judgment) (“By requiring Spisak’s jury to decide first whether the State had met 
its burden with respect to the death sentence, and to reach that decision unanimously, the 
instructions deprived the jury of a meaningful opportunity to consider the third option that was 
before it, namely, a life sentence.”). 
36 See Blueford v. Arkansas, 132 S. Ct. 2044, 2052 (2012). 
37 Blueford v. State, 370 S.W.3d 496, 497 (Ark. 2011), aff ’d, 132 S. Ct. 2044. 
38 Id.  
39 Id. 
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charge of manslaughter, you will then consider the charge of negligent hom-
icide.40  
The court then presented the jury with a set of verdict forms, allowing 
the jury to either convict Blueford of one of the charged offenses or acquit 
him of all offenses; the jury was not permitted to acquit on some offenses 
but not others.41  
After deliberating for a few hours, the jury foreperson reported to the 
trial judge that the jury was deadlocked.42 The court inquired as to the 
jury’s progress on each offense and the foreperson disclosed that the jury 
was unanimous against the charges of capital murder and first-degree 
murder, was deadlocked on manslaughter, and had not yet voted on negli-
gent homicide.43 The court ordered the jury to continue deliberation.44 
After another thirty minutes, the jury remained deadlocked.45 Without re-
polling the jury on its progress with respect to each of the four charges or 
providing partial verdict forms, the court declared a mistrial.46  
When Arkansas subsequently sought to retry Blueford for capital and 
first-degree murder, he moved to dismiss the charges on double jeopardy 
grounds.47 Blueford argued that the jury foreperson’s report constituted an 
express acquittal as to the capital and first-degree murder charges, or in the 
alternative, that the jury’s consideration of the lesser charges constituted an 
implicit acquittal as to the greater.48  
 
40 Blueford, 132 S. Ct. at 2048 (ellipses in original). This language, taken directly from Arkan-
sas’s model criminal jury instruction, ARKANSAS MODEL JURY INSTRUCTIONS: CRIMINAL No. 
302 (Ark. Supreme Court Comm. on Criminal Jury Instructions, 2d ed. 1994), has been interpreted 
by the Supreme Court of Arkansas as requiring a jury to complete its deliberations on a greater 
offense before it may consider a lesser. See Hughes v. State, 66 S.W.3d 645, 651 (Ark. 2002) 
(“[B]efore [a jury] may consider any lesser-included offense, the jury must first determine that the 
proof is insufficient to convict on the greater offense. Thus, the jury must, in essence, acquit the 
defendant of the greater offense before considering his or her guilt on the lesser-included offense.”). 
41 Blueford, 132 S. Ct. at 2049. I also refer to these jury instructions as “single verdict” or 
“convict-on-any-or-acquit-on-all” instructions. 
42 Id. 
43 Id. 
44 Id. 
45 Id. 
46 Id. As mentioned in Section I.A, supra, a mistrial does not bar retrial under the Double 
Jeopardy Clause if declaration of a mistrial is manifestly necessary. 
47 Id. 
48 See Brief for Petitioner at 15, Blueford, 132 S. Ct. 2044 (No. 10-1320), 2011 WL 5971358 
(“[T]he jury instructions establish acquittals on the greater offenses by virtue of the jury’s 
deadlock on the lesser-included offense.”). 
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Arkansas asserted that the foreperson’s report was not an acquittal because 
it did not bear the hallmarks of finality,49 and that the acquittal-first jury 
instructions did not render the mid-deliberation report of the jury’s deadlock 
an implicit acquittal.50 The state argued that this was a standard case in which 
a deadlocked jury manifestly necessitated the declaration of a mistrial.51 The 
trial court denied Blueford’s motion to dismiss, and the Supreme Court of 
Arkansas affirmed on interlocutory appeal.52 On October 11, 2011, the United 
States Supreme Court granted Blueford’s petition for certiorari.53  
B. Why Grant Certiorari? 
Does a jury foreperson’s report to a judge carry any weight? Do criminal 
defendants have a constitutional right to partial verdicts? Does the refusal 
of a court to poll the jury preclude manifest necessity for granting a mistrial 
and, therefore, bar retrial under the concept of double jeopardy? The 
Blueford Court would implicitly or explicitly resolve all of these questions. 
The Court faced two primary issues in Blueford: (1) whether to require 
additional action—either by providing partial verdict forms or polling the 
jury—before a trial judge may declare a mistrial under the doctrine of 
manifest necessity,54 and (2) what impact acquittal-first jury instructions 
should have on the finality of jury verdicts, including whether a foreman’s 
report to a judge constitutes an acquittal.55 
This first issue has sparked debate among lower courts in recent years.56 
A majority of acquittal-first jurisdictions have held that “polling the jury on 
the various possible verdicts submitted to it would constitute an unwarranted 
and unwise intrusion into the province of the jury,”57 reasoning that “jury 
votes on included offenses may be the result of a temporary compromise in 
 
49 See Brief for Respondent at 9, Blueford, 132 S. Ct. 2044 (No. 10-1320), 2012 WL 20549 
(arguing that an acquittal “is a resolution; it represents juror agreement at the end of deliberations; 
it is unmistakably clear when it is issued; and it ordinarily cannot be reconsidered once it is 
accepted”). 
50 See id. at 10-11. 
51 Id. at 8. 
52 Blueford v. State, 370 S.W.3d 496, 499, 502 (Ark. 2011), aff ’d, 132 S. Ct. 2044. 
53 Blueford v. Arkansas, 132 S. Ct. 397, 397 (2011). 
54 Blueford, 132 S. Ct. at 2052. 
55 Id. at 2051. 
56 See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Roth, 776 N.E.2d 437, 447 n.10 (Mass. 2002) (asserting that 
several jurisdictions have expressed “diametrically opposed” views on the subject of partial 
verdicts’ impact on double jeopardy). 
57 State v. Booker, 293 S.E.2d 78, 80-81 (N.C. 1982) (emphasis omitted) (quoting People v. 
Hickey, 303 N.W.2d 19, 21 (Mich. Ct. App. 1981)).  
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an effort to reach unanimity.”58 A minority of jurisdictions, however, require 
partial verdicts before declaring a mistrial owing to a hung jury. These 
states show greater deference to the concept of manifest necessity and 
declare that there can be no manifest necessity warranting the declaration of 
a mistrial where the trial court makes no inquiry into the jury’s delibera-
tions as to the greater offenses.59 The minority has held that a judge must 
poll the jury before declaring a mistrial because, if the jury is deadlocked 
only as to the lesser offenses, the Double Jeopardy Clause requires a partial 
verdict of acquittal as to the greater offenses.60 
C. The Supreme Court’s Decision 
Chief Justice Roberts wrote for the majority in resolving the issues pre-
sented in Blueford. The Court found, by a 6–3 margin, that double jeopardy 
did not bar retrial because Blueford was neither convicted nor acquitted of 
any of the charges against him. 61  In reaching this holding, the Court 
addressed two issues. First, the Court determined that the jury foreperson’s 
report—explaining that the jury unanimously opposed the capital and first-
degree murder charges—did not constitute an acquittal.62 Second, the Court 
declared that the trial court was not required to take further action before 
declaring a mistrial based on manifest necessity.63  
In rejecting the notion that the trial judge should have taken action to 
determine whether the jury remained unanimous against the greater 
charges, Chief Justice Roberts relied heavily on past precedent, noting “[w]e 
have never required a trial court, before declaring a mistrial because of a 
hung jury, to consider any particular means of breaking the impasse—let 
alone to consider giving the jury new options for a verdict.”64 The Chief 
 
58 Hickey, 303 N.W.2d at 21. 
59 See, e.g., Stone v. Superior Court, 646 P.2d 809, 820 (Cal. 1982) (en banc). Several states 
have held that there can be no manifest necessity to declare a mistrial where the trial court fails to 
inquire as to a partial verdict. See, e.g., State v. Tate, 773 A.2d 308, 324-25 (Conn. 2001); State v. 
Pugliese, 422 A.2d 1319, 1321 (N.H. 1980); see also Whiteaker v. State, 808 P.2d 270, 277-78 (Alaska 
Ct. App. 1991). 
60 See Stone, 646 P.2d at 820.  
61 See Blueford v. Arkansas, 132 S. Ct. 2044, 2053 (2012). 
62 Id. at 2050. 
63 Id. at 2052-53. 
64 Id. at 2052. 
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Justice was not blind to the fact that, because of the unique jury forms, the 
jury did not have the option to partially acquit.65  
After brusquely resolving the partial verdict issue—the main subject of 
the circuit split—Chief Justice Roberts dedicated most of the opinion to 
explaining that the jury foreperson’s report lacked finality and, therefore, 
constituted neither an implicit nor explicit acquittal.66 The Chief Justice 
explained that the foreperson’s report “was not a final resolution of any-
thing” because it was made before the jury had concluded deliberations, 
thus depriving it of the finality necessary to constitute an acquittal.67  
Chief Justice Roberts further emphasized the need for finality by reject-
ing any analogy to two previous Supreme Court cases that discussed 
implicit acquittals, Green v. United States68 and Price v. Georgia69—cases on 
which Blueford heavily relied.70 In Green and Price, the Chief Justice noted, 
the Court held that “the Double Jeopardy Clause is violated when a defend-
ant, tried for a greater offense and convicted of a lesser included offense, is 
later retried for the greater offense.”71 Blueford argued that the only differ-
ence between his case and Green and Price was that in those cases, the defend-
ant was actually convicted, whereas in Blueford’s case, the jury was 
deadlocked—a distinction that should “only favor[] him, because the 
Double Jeopardy Clause should, if anything, afford greater protection to a 
defendant who is not found guilty of the lesser included offense.”72 Chief 
Justice Roberts rejected this argument, concluding that it unjustifiably 
assumed that “the votes reported by the foreperson did not change, even 
though the jury deliberated further after that report.”73 
In rejecting Blueford’s argument that “an acquittal is a matter of sub-
stance,”74 Chief Justice Roberts essentially admitted that he was exalting form 
over substance. He substantiated his reasoning by devising hypothetical 
 
65 See id. (“As permitted under Arkansas law, the jury’s options in this case were limited to 
two: either convict on one of the offenses, or acquit on all.”). 
66 The implicit or explicit nature of an acquittal is irrelevant to the double jeopardy inquiry. 
Retrial is barred “whether that acquittal is express or implied by a conviction on a lesser included 
offense when the jury was given a full opportunity to return a verdict on the greater charge.” Price 
v. Georgia, 398 U.S. 323, 329 (1970) (footnote omitted). 
67 Blueford, 132 S. Ct. at 2050. 
68 355 U.S. 184 (1957). 
69 398 U.S. 323. 
70 See Brief for Petitioner, supra note 48, at 15 (citing Green and Price to argue that the “Court 
repeatedly has concluded that a jury has reached a verdict based on what is necessarily implied by 
its actions”). 
71 Blueford, 132 S. Ct. at 2052 (citing Price, 398 U.S. at 329; Green, 355 U.S. at 190). 
72 Id. 
73 Id. 
74 Id. at 2050. 
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situations to demonstrate why the foreperson’s report lacked the finality 
necessary to bar retrial. After acknowledging that “[a] jury is presumed to 
follow its instructions,”75 the Chief Justice concluded that, hypothetically, 
the jury could nevertheless have changed its mind about one of the greater 
offenses after deliberating over a lesser offense—arguably in contravention 
of its instructions76—since votes taken in a jury room prior to being returned 
in open court are merely preliminary and are not binding on the jury.77 
D. The Dissent 
The dissenting opinion, authored by Justice Sotomayor and joined by 
Justices Ginsburg and Kagan, highlights several of the weaknesses in the 
majority’s analysis and finds that, by exalting form over substance, the 
majority broke the cardinal rule of not allowing the state another “bite at 
the apple.”78 Justice Sotomayor’s dissent provides the better assessment of 
the case because it directly addresses the salient issues that arise in acquit-
tal-first, single verdict jurisdictions. The dissent explains that although the 
Arkansas acquittal-first jury instructions do not expressly forbid reconsidera-
tion, the way they are written and the manner in which they were explained 
to the jury clearly indicate that the jury did intend to acquit Blueford on the 
capital and first-degree murder charges.79 Justice Sotomayor emphasized 
that if the concern was finality, the foreperson’s colloquy with the judge left 
little doubt that the jury’s deliberations as to the capital and first-degree 
murder charges were unanimous.80 
Justice Sotomayor would have held that Blueford was acquitted of capi-
tal and first-degree murder81 or, at a minimum, that double jeopardy barred 
retrial on those charges because the trial court should have taken further 
action (and honored Blueford’s request for a partial verdict) before declaring 
a mistrial. 82  Justice Sotomayor’s approach would have more properly 
safeguarded against double jeopardy violations. 
 
75 Id. at 2051 (quoting Weeks v. Angelone, 528 U.S. 225, 234 (2000)). 
76 Id. at 2054 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (“The State's closing arguments repeated this directive: 
‘[B]efore you can consider a lesser included of capital murder, you must first, all ��, vote that this 
man is not guilty of capital murder.’” (alteration in original)). 
77 Id. at 2051 (majority opinion). 
78 Id. at 2053 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). 
79 Id. at 2056-57. 
80 Id. at 2056. 
81 Id. at 2054-55.  
82 See id. at 2058 (noting that while a jury’s “genuine inability” to reach a verdict constitutes 
manifest necessity to declare a mistrial, a jury in an acquittal-first jurisdiction “that advances to 
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E. Analysis of the Decision 
1. Strengths 
Before discussing the decision’s weaknesses, it is worth recognizing what 
the Court did right. Though this Note contends that Blueford was wrongly 
decided, the decision does have several strengths: its easy-to-follow, bright-
line rule on finality; its preservation of jury rooms as black boxes; and its 
deference to the Court’s past double jeopardy decisions, as well as those of 
lower courts. 
The first strength of the decision is Chief Justice Roberts’s establish-
ment of a bright-line—though ultimately too formalistic—rule: that a 
foreman’s report in open court is not an acquittal. There is continuous 
debate over rules versus standards and “whether the certainty and even-
handedness of a clear, bright-line rule justifies the possibility that the rule 
may work imperfectly in some cases.”83 The rule that an acquittal cannot 
occur while a jury is still deliberating makes double jeopardy issues easier to 
resolve. Furthermore, the Chief Justice’s emphasis on the need for finality 
is especially fitting because one of the main policy justifications behind the 
Double Jeopardy Clause is the importance of the finality of decisions, be 
they acquittals or convictions.84  
Second, Chief Justice Roberts’s opinion valiantly attempts to protect the 
clandestine jury process. Requiring judges to inquire into the details of a 
jury’s deliberations before they have concluded could hinder this furtive 
process.85 Juries are black boxes and they need not justify their verdicts nor 
explain their reasoning, but rather, should remain “completely independent: 
of the state, of the parties and of the community itself.”86 “Unlike most 
aspects of a criminal trial that are open for everyone to see, jury deliberations 
 
the consideration of a lesser included offense has not demonstrated [such] an inability” with 
respect to the greater offense). 
83 Teare v. Comm. on Admissions, 566 A.2d 23, 30 (D.C. 1989). 
84 See, e.g., Yeager v. United States, 129 S. Ct. 2360, 2365-66 (2009). 
85 I argue later, however, that this argument falls flat. See infra Section III.B; cf. Mary S. 
O’Keefe, Note, Acceptance of Partial Verdicts as a Safeguard Against Double Jeopardy, 53 FORDHAM 
L. REV. 889, 898 (1985) (“The contention that a partial verdict would be coercive because it 
requires an ‘unwarranted and unwise intrusion into the province of the jury’ is equally unsupported 
by the facts surrounding the receipt of a partial verdict. Coercion is only a concern when the jury 
is still considering its verdict. A deadlocked jury has completed its deliberations; inquiry into 
whether a partial verdict has been reached will therefore not be intrusive.” (footnotes omitted)). 
86 Barbara A. Babcock, Opinion, Preserving the Jury's Privacy, N.Y. TIMES ( July 24, 2002), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2002/07/24/opinion/preserving-the-jury-s-privacy.html. 
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are secret. There are no exact procedures that jurors must follow during these 
deliberations. The jury is free to deliberate in any manner that it sees fit.”87 
Third, the Court deferred to both lower court decisions and past prece-
dent. Double jeopardy jurisprudence has long placed tremendous weight on 
deference to lower court judges: “The decision whether to grant a mistrial is 
reserved to the ‘broad discretion’ of the trial judge, a point that ‘has been 
consistently reiterated in decisions of this Court.’”88 Chief Justice Roberts 
relied heavily on past precedent in determining that the trial judge was not 
required to take action before declaring a mistrial.89  The fact that the 
“Court had never ‘overturned a trial court’s declaration of a mistrial after a 
jury was unable to reach a verdict on the ground that the “manifest 
necessity” standard had not been met’”90 made the majority understandably 
hesitant to do so for the first time in Blueford. Although the resulting decision 
was admittedly rigid, it gave deference to almost two hundred years of case 
law, thereby strengthening the past rulings of the Supreme Court.  
Ultimately, the majority opinion is fairly persuasive. It establishes an 
easy-to-follow rule that promotes the goal of finality, protects the integrity 
of the jury system, gives fair deference to lower court judges, and is con-
sistent with hundreds of years of developing case law. The decision’s 
weaknesses and omissions, however, cannot be ignored. 
2. Missing the Forest for the Trees:  
Exploring Blueford’s Weaknesses 
Despite its strengths, Chief Justice Roberts’s opinion is, in the end, too 
formalistic. It draws bright lines that are too rigid and may lead to adverse 
results, it is too deferential to past precedent, and it fails to substantively 
address Arkansas’s unique jury instructions. By interpreting the Double 
Jeopardy Clause so narrowly and failing to account for the policy rationale 
 
87  Deliberations in the Jury Room, LAWYERS.COM, http://criminal.lawyers.com/Criminal-
Law-Basics/Deliberations-in-the-Jury-Room.html (last visited Jan. 25, 2013); see also Julie A. 
Seaman, Black Boxes, 58 EMORY L.J. 427, 432 (2008) (noting that juries perform their role “as fact 
finder shrouded in secrecy, and it is impossible to say why or how the jury convicted or acquitted 
in any given case”). 
88 Renico v. Lett, 130 S. Ct. 1855, 1863 (2010) (quoting Illinois v. Somerville, 410 U.S. 458, 
462 (1973)); see also Arizona v. Washington, 434 U.S. 497, 510 (1978) (“The trial judge’s decision to 
declare a mistrial when he considers the jury deadlocked is therefore accorded great deference by a 
reviewing court.”). 
89 See Blueford v. Arkansas, 132 S. Ct. 2044, 2052 (2012). 
90  Renico, 130 S. Ct. at 1864 (quoting Winston v. Moore, 452 U.S. 944, 947 (1981) 
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari)). 
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behind it, the Court failed to provide proper protection to citizens facing 
retrial. 
Although line-drawing is often arbitrary, bright-line rules provide cer-
tain undeniable benefits: judicial economy, predictability, and fairness. 
Where, however, the line drawn by the court is too formalistic, it can lead 
to absurd outcomes.91 As the Blueford dissent recognized, “[i]n ascertaining 
whether an acquittal has occurred, ‘form is not to be exalted over sub-
stance.’”92 The Court failed to give proper weight to the undeniable impli-
cation of the intersection between acquittal-first instructions and double 
jeopardy—that is, if a jury must acquit on a greater charge before consider-
ing a lesser, by deliberating on that lesser charge, the jury has functionally 
acquitted as to the greater. 
The majority focused heavily on finality but failed to appreciate that in 
acquittal-first jurisdictions, finality is often unattainable. Chief Justice 
Roberts’s conclusion that the jury foreperson’s report was not final cannot 
be reconciled with acquittal-first jury instructions generally. At crucial 
times, the Court seemed to contradict its own reasoning. For example, the 
Chief Justice stated that a jury is presumed to follow its instructions.93 
According to this logic, the jury would have had to first acquit Blueford of 
the greater charges before deliberating on the lesser. However, Chief Justice 
Roberts ultimately justified the majority’s holding by arguing that in 
acquittal-first jurisdictions, there is nothing preventing the jury from later 
changing its mind as to the greater charge.94 This argument fails. 
First, given the circumstances of the case, not only did the jury probably 
intend to acquit Blueford of capital and first-degree murder, but also, under 
the acquittal-first instructions, its report was, as a logical matter, final. The 
trial court’s instructions—that if the jurors had a reasonable doubt as to 
Blueford’s guilt on a greater charge, they must then deliberate on a lesser 
charge—are telling: “reasonable doubt” is the burden of proof in a criminal 
prosecution in Arkansas.95 So, if it is fair to assume that the jurors followed 
the instructions of the trial court, it must also be fair to assume—as Justice 
 
91 See, e.g., Blueford, 132 S. Ct. at 2056 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (noting that, in substance, 
the announcement in open court of the jury’s unanimous vote against the capital and first-degree 
murder charges was tantamount to a formal acquittal, yet this announcement offered Blueford no 
double jeopardy protection). 
92 Id. (quoting Sanabria v. United States, 437 U.S. 54, 66 (1978)). 
93 Id. at 2051 (majority opinion). 
94 Id. 
95 ARKANSAS MODEL JURY INSTRUCTIONS: CRIMINAL No. 110 (Ark. Supreme Court 
Comm. on Criminal Jury Instructions, 2d ed. 1994). 
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Sotomayor noted in dissent96—that the jury did not move on to deliberate 
the lesser charges until it had made a definitive determination that the 
prosecution failed to meet its burden of proof as to the greater charges. 
Indeed, the prosecution clarified for the jury that “before you can consider a 
lesser included of capital murder, you must first, all ��, vote that this man is 
not guilty of capital murder,”97 explaining that this was “not a situation 
where you just lay everything out here and say, well, we have four choices. 
Which one does it fit the most?”98 Chief Justice Roberts’s assertion that the 
jury could have subsequently reconsidered its unanimous vote does not hold 
water as applied to the facts of this case.99  
Second, the Court was overly deferential to the trial judge’s finding of 
manifest necessity. Although the Court has “expressly declined to require 
the ‘mechanical application’ of any ‘rigid formula’ when a trial judge decides 
to declare a mistrial due to jury deadlock,”100 the Court has emphasized that 
manifest necessity is a high bar: “[T]he power ought to be used with the 
greatest caution, under urgent circumstances, and for very plain and obvious 
causes . . . .”101 Such urgent circumstances were not present in Blueford. In 
order to provide citizens with full double jeopardy protection under the 
Fifth Amendment, the Court should have subjected the trial judge’s 
decision to declare a mistrial to greater scrutiny. 
Third, Blueford essentially eliminated “implicit acquittals” in acquittal-
first jurisdictions, except in situations where the jury convicts on one of the 
lesser charges. Courts have regularly held that when a jury convicts on a 
lesser included charge, the defendant has been implicitly acquitted on the 
 
96 Blueford, 132 S. Ct. at 2054 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting). 
97 Id. at 2048 (majority opinion) (emphasis added). 
98 Id. 
99 Although from a formalist perspective, Justice Roberts was correct that “nothing in the 
instructions prohibited the jury from reconsidering such a vote,” id. at 2051, I do not agree that the 
jury either believed it could reconsider or intended to reconsider. As Justice Sotomayor argued, 
the jury “scrupulously” followed its instructions to unanimously acquit of the more serious charges 
before moving forward, and the only plausible inference is that the jurors spent the thirty minutes 
after the forewoman announced the jury’s unanimous vote debating not the greater charges on 
which all were agreed, but the charge of manslaughter on which they were deadlocked. See id. at 
2056 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting). 
100 Renico v. Lett, 130 S. Ct. 1855, 1858 (2010) (quoting Wade v. Hunter, 336 U.S. 684, 691 
(1949)). 
101 United States v. Perez, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 579, 580 (1824). The Court has consistently 
reiterated this high bar for establishing manifest necessity. See, e.g., Arizona v. Washington, 434 
U.S. 497, 506 (1978) (requiring a “high degree” of necessity before concluding that a mistrial is 
appropriate). 
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greater charges.102 Blueford makes clear that a jury deadlocked on the lesser 
charge does not merit the same treatment. As the Blueford dissent recog-
nized, however, “[i]t would be anomalous if the Double Jeopardy Clause 
offered less protection to a defendant whose jury has deadlocked on the 
lesser and thus convicted of nothing at all.”103 Under Blueford’s reasoning, in 
a convict-on-any-or-acquit-on-all jurisdiction, if a jury unanimously voted 
to acquit Defendant A on first-degree murder but was hung on negligent 
homicide, double jeopardy protection would not be triggered. Yet, if with 
respect to Defendant B, that same jury voted unanimously against first-
degree murder but convicted on negligent homicide, Defendant B would be 
entitled to double jeopardy protection against retrial on the first-degree 
murder charge. Therefore, at least with respect to double jeopardy, Defend-
ant B would be better off than Defendant A, against whom the prosecution 
presumably had a weaker case.  
Fourth, the Court should have spent more time addressing acquittal-
first jury instructions and whether the trial judge was required to poll the 
jury or provide partial verdict forms before declaring a mistrial. Most 
notable in the Blueford decision is not what Chief Justice Roberts wrote, but 
what he failed to write. The legally formalistic decision is almost completely 
devoid of any substantive discussion of acquittal-first jury instructions or 
partial verdicts. The key legal issue in Blueford stems from the implications 
of acquittal-first jury instructions on the operation of the Double Jeopardy 
Clause, but even after Blueford, that issue remains largely unresolved. 
III. OPTIONS AFTER BLUEFORD  
Despite Blueford’s attempt to draw clear, bright-line rules, Chief Justice 
Roberts’s opinion leaves many issues unresolved. To best resolve these 
issues while respecting the Court’s decision, state legislatures should elimi-
nate acquittal-first instructions altogether or, at a minimum, require trial 
judges to poll the jury or provide partial verdict forms before finding 
manifest necessity to declare a mistrial. 
 
102 See, e.g., Price v. Georgia, 398 U.S. 323, 326-27 (1970); Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 
184, 190 (1957); People v. Gause, 971 N.E.2d 341, 342 (N.Y. 2012). 
103 Blueford, 132 S. Ct. at 2058 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting). 
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A. States Should Eliminate Acquittal-First Instructions 
 with Single Verdict Forms 
Although the Blueford Court refused to hold them unconstitutional,104 
states should eliminate acquittal-first jury instructions with single verdict 
forms105 because they impinge on protections that are vital to our criminal 
justice system.106 Before Blueford, the Court had, in certain circumstances, 
questioned the validity of jury instructions that limited a jury’s options for 
conviction.107 While there are both benefits and drawbacks to acquittal-first 
instructions,108 when paired with a failure to poll the jury or to provide 
partial verdict forms, they impede double jeopardy protection and encroach 
on the province of the jury.  
Acquittal-first instructions, combined with single verdict forms, give the 
state too much power. The state, with all of its resources, should not be able 
to use coercive jury forms or confusing instructions to ensure conviction. If 
the prosecution cannot prove its case beyond a reasonable doubt, it should 
not be able to manipulate the jury’s deliberations to increase the likelihood 
of either conviction on a lesser offense or a hung jury, thereby giving the 
state another “bite at the apple.”109 
 
104 In fact, Chief Justice Roberts largely glossed over the question of the constitutionality of 
acquittal-first jury instructions. 
105 Some states have already done so. See, e.g., State v. LeBlanc, 924 P.2d 441, 442 (Ariz. 
1996) (en banc) (concluding that the elimination of acquittal-first instructions “reduces the risks of 
false unanimity and coerced verdicts [because] [w]hen jurors harbor a doubt as to guilt on the 
greater offense but are convinced the defendant is culpable to a lesser degree, they may be more 
apt to vote for conviction on the principal charge out of fear that to do otherwise would permit a 
guilty person to go free”); Green v. State, 80 P.3d 93, 96 (Nev. 2003) (rejecting the use of an 
acquittal-first transition instruction because it “improperly invites compromise verdicts,” and 
approving the use of an “unable to agree” transition instruction). 
106 There are, however, many states that use these instructions, including but not limited to 
Alaska, California, Connecticut, New Hampshire, and New Mexico. See Blueford, 132 S. Ct. at 
2058 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (collecting cases). 
107 Cf., e.g., Beck v. Alabama, 447 U.S. 625, 627 (1980) (holding it unconstitutional to with-
hold from a jury the option of convicting a capital defendant of a lesser included offense). 
Although Beck did not specifically deal with acquittal-first jury instructions, the instructions that 
the Court found unconstitutional stifled the jury’s deliberations and actions in the same way that 
the Blueford instructions, which prohibited the jury from issuing a partial verdict, did.  
108 See Laura Anne Cooper, Comment, Should Juries Be Able to Agree to Disagree?: People v. 
Boettcher and the “Unanimous Acquittal First” Instruction, 54 BROOK. L. REV. 1027, 1044-48 (1988); 
supra notes 33-34 and accompanying text. 
109 See supra text accompanying note 78; cf. Arizona v. Washington, 434 U.S. 497, 507-08 
(1978) (noting that the Double Jeopardy Clause is intended to prevent prosecutors from declaring 
a mistrial in order to obtain a more favorable opportunity to convict the defendant). 
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Under Blueford, there is nothing to prevent an overzealous prosecutor 
from abusing the lesser included offense instruction when the state’s 
evidence is insufficient, thereby allowing the state a “second shot” at 
conviction. If a prosecutor, who is certain the defendant is guilty but cannot 
prove it, added some lesser included offense hoping to hang the jury, she 
might be able to buy the state more time to find evidence.110 Of course, 
juries are more likely to hang whenever lesser included offenses are charged, 
but without single verdict forms, they will be more likely to find a charge 
on which all jurors agree—even if that agreement comes in the form of 
acquittal as to the greater charge. 
Acquittal-first jury instructions with single verdict forms also impede 
the jury process. The U.S. justice system uses a secret jury process because 
juries require independence to come to an accurate, unanimous decision.111 
These jury instructions interfere with how a jury deliberates, but provide no 
legitimate countervailing, justice-promoting benefits. The jury’s free will 
regarding how to most justly and efficiently deliberate is overridden.112  
The issues raised in Blueford could therefore evaporate if states, either 
through judicial decree or legislation, banned the concurrent use of single 
verdict jury forms and acquittal-first jury instructions. 
B. States Should Mandate that Trial Judges  
Take Action Before Declaring a Mistrial 
Even if states choose not to do away with acquittal-first instructions, 
there are less drastic measures available to remedy the problems created by 
Blueford. Justice Sotomayor, writing for the Blueford dissent, got it right 
when she proffered, “I would therefore hold that the Double Jeopardy 
Clause requires a trial judge, in an acquittal-first jurisdiction, to honor a 
defendant’s request for a partial verdict before declaring a mistrial on the 
ground of jury deadlock.”113 This remedy—which could be implemented by 
 
110 Cf. generally Catherine L. Carpenter, The All-or-Nothing Doctrine in Criminal Cases: Inde-
pendent Trial Strategy or Gamesmanship Gone Awry?, 26 AM. J. CRIM. L. 257 (1999) (discussing 
parties’ strategies in deciding whether to ask the court to instruct the jury on lesser included 
offenses); Monroe H. Freedman, The Use of Unethical and Unconstitutional Practices and Policies by 
Prosecutors’ Offices, 52 WASHBURN L.J. 1 (2012) (discussing prosecutorial misconduct, especially 
when prosecutors purposefully violate defendants’ constitutional rights). 
111 See generally Seaman, supra note 87. 
112 In extreme cases like Blueford, acquittal-first instructions combined with single verdict 
forms lead to a result no different from a judge refusing to acknowledge a jury’s verdict and 
declaring a mistrial. 
113 Blueford v. Arkansas, 132 S. Ct. 2044, 2058 (2012) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting). 
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the legislature or by courts—would reinstitute the seemingly forgotten high 
bar of manifest necessity.  
Defendants’ Fifth Amendment rights are not adequately protected if 
judges in acquittal-first jurisdictions retain the discretion to decline to poll 
juries before declaring a mistrial. One commentator noted that “judges now 
know that if they want to prevent a retrial of charges that the jury has 
already acquitted, they must get a formal statement of a verdict on all 
counts from hung juries,” but a judge with the primary goal of preserving 
the prosecutor’s options could “simply do what the judge did in Blueford.”114 
But judges should not be able to “preserve the prosecutor’s options”115: the 
Double Jeopardy Clause is expressly aimed at preventing this type of 
manipulative behavior.116 
This solution is consistent with Blueford because the Court, though hold-
ing that a judge is not required to poll the jury or to offer partial verdict 
forms, made no mention of whether states could mandate that judges follow 
this procedure—and thus neither expressly nor impliedly banned any such 
rule or law. Constitutional protections relating to criminal procedure are the 
floor, not the ceiling, and a state remains free to provide greater protection 
to its citizens than the Constitution requires.117 For jurisdictions that, prior 
to Blueford, required partial verdicts before the declaration of a mistrial 
owing to a hung jury,118 there is no constitutional barrier preventing them 
from continuing to do so. 
Requiring trial judges to poll an alleged hung jury before declaring a 
mistrial would not intrude upon the jury process or overrule precedent, but 
would instead create a procedural safeguard for the Double Jeopardy 
Clause—similar to the now-mandated Miranda warnings, which protect the 
Fifth Amendment’s right against self-incrimination. 119  Further, if trial 
judges were required to take a quick poll, significant government resources 
would be conserved by avoiding retrial (on some or all charges), which 
would drastically increase judicial efficiency.  
 
114 Craig M. Bradley, What Is Double Jeopardy?, TRIAL, Dec. 2012, at 52, 53. 
115 Id. 
116 See supra text accompanying note 110. 
117 Cf. Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1068 (1983) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (asserting that 
“Michigan simply provided greater protection to one of its citizens than some other State might 
provide or, indeed, than this Court might require throughout the country”). 
118 See supra note 60. 
119 Miranda warnings are not themselves constitutionally required, Michigan v. Tucker, 417 
U.S. 433, 443-�� (����), but function as procedural safeguards through which to effectuate the 
Fifth Amendment’s guaranteed protections.  
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Some courts label jury polling “an unwarranted and unwise intrusion 
into the province of the jury.”120 I argue instead, however, that acquittal-
first instructions constitute the more significant intrusion. Admittedly, it 
seems odd—if jury independence and secrecy are of such great im-
portance—to ask a jury to complete additional forms or require it to speak 
with the judge more often. It could be asserted that my argument is para-
doxical: instructions encroach on the jury’s province, but courts should 
nevertheless provide more of them. However, encouraging states to elimi-
nate acquittal-first instructions and to add a requirement of partial verdict 
forms or jury polling before declaring a mistrial, is fully consistent with 
allowing juries complete freedom to deliberate. Because the forms or polling 
would be required only as a last resort, after the jury had completed its 
deliberations and immediately before declaring a mistrial, there would be no 
intrusion on or interruption of the jury’s free and confidential deliberations.121 
CONCLUSION 
Blueford v. Arkansas will affect many citizens whose liberty hangs in the 
balance. Chief Justice Roberts strayed from the Double Jeopardy Clause’s 
fundamental protections by holding, first, that a jury foreperson’s report in 
an acquittal-first jurisdiction did not constitute an acquittal; and second, 
that the trial judge was not required to poll the jury to establish manifest 
necessity to declare a mistrial. The opinion is overly formalistic, and does 
little to alleviate the issues plaguing acquittal-first jurisdictions. Fortunately, 
states remain at liberty to combat the problems associated with messy 
acquittal-first jury instructions, which do little besides confuse both judges 
and juries,122 by eliminating this type of instruction altogether. 
Alternatively, requiring judges to poll juries or to provide partial verdict 
forms before declaring a mistrial would properly protect defendants’ rights. 
In spite of Blueford’s holding, states remain free to offer protections that 
extend beyond the constitutional minimum and some have continued to 
mandate that trial judges poll juries to provide proper protection under the 
Double Jeopardy Clause.123 I am advocating not that states unreasonably 
 
120 People v. Hickey, 303 N.W.2d 19, 21 (Mich. Ct. App. 1981). 
121 See O’Keefe, supra note 85, at 898 (“A deadlocked jury has completed its deliberations; 
inquiry into whether a partial verdict has been reached will therefore not be intrusive.”). 
122 See, e.g., Blueford v. Arkansas, 132 S. Ct. 2044, 2059-60 (2012) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) 
(noting that even the trial judge was confused by the Arkansas jury instructions). 
123 See, e.g., State v. Fennell, �� A.�d ���, ��� (Md. ����) (“[B]efore a proper finding of 
manifest necessity for a mistrial could have been made, the trial judge should have inquired into 
the jury's status of unanimity prior to its discharge.”). 
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extend the scope of the Constitution’s protections or overturn hundreds of 
years of precedent, but only that they adopt procedural safeguards that will 
provide every citizen with the protections enumerated in the Double 
Jeopardy Clause; no more, no less.  
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